合肥知识产权律师网
作 者 | 程 芳 中伦律师事务所合伙人
王广巍 中伦律师事务所合伙人
陈津民 中伦律师事务所外国法律顾问
来 源 | 知产力
随着通信技术的飞速发展，涉及标准必要专利（Standard Essential Patents, SEP）的争端与日俱增。其中标准必要专利权人禁令救济的问题引起了实务界的广泛关注。
在美国，一般认为专利侵权禁令救济须遵循四要素检测标准①，但由于美国法院通常认为，专利权人作出FRAND（Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory）承诺，视为接受了金钱赔偿足以弥补损失，且FRAND承诺的本意就是维护公共利益的承诺，因此专利权人很难证明要素1、2和4，禁令申请很难获得支持。但在苹果诉摩托罗拉案中，上诉法院指出，某些情形下标准必要专利权人理论上存在获得禁令救济的可能，如侵权人拒绝支付FRAND许可费或不合理地拖延谈判。
而在欧洲，德国法院似乎借鉴了美国的做法，认为标准必要专利权人须满足八个条件②才能得到禁令救济。据调查，截止目前美国和欧洲还不曾有标准必要专利权人申请禁令救济成功的案例。中国的司法和执法实践也借鉴了美国和欧洲的做法，在立法、司法审判、行政执法过程中均有所体现。本文将结合国内外的立法、司法和执法实践，探讨标准必要专利权人在中国获得禁令救济的条件，以求解决标准必要专利权人面临的维权困境。
一、中国法院的做法及观点
中国法院似乎更关注专利权人和被许可人的主观心态，规定了发出禁令的否定性条件。例如，在华为诉交互数字反垄断案中，法院将交互数字对华为的许可条件与对苹果、三星等公司的许可条件相比较，认定交互数字违背了FRAND承诺并且无视华为在许可谈判过程中的善意，视交互数字在美国提起的必要专利禁令之诉为“意图通过诉讼手段威胁强迫华为公司接受过高的专利许可条件”。法院暗示了，标准必要专利权人若违背FRAND义务，将难以获得禁令救济。
之后在2014年7月31日公布的《最高人民法院关于审理侵犯专利权纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的解释（二）》（公开征求意见稿）中，对许可合同双方主观心态的考量也是是否可以发禁令的一项主要参数，例如，该解释第二十五条规定，“……被诉侵权人与专利权人协商该专利的实施许可条件时，专利权人故意违反其在标准制定中承诺的公平、合理、无歧视的许可义务，导致无法达成专利实施许可合同，且被诉侵权人在协商中无明显过错的，对于权利人请求停止标准实施行为的主张，人民法院一般不予支持”。这里体现的观点，与前述华为诉交互数字反垄断案判决所持观点是一致的，即标准必要专利权人若没有善意履行FRAND义务，且被许可人进行了善意磋商，专利权人将难以获得禁令救济。
二、中国行政机关的做法及观点
与中国法院的观点类似，中国行政机关将“标准必要专利权人履行FRAND承诺，而标准必要专利使用人没有善意签订FRAND许可并遵守许可条款”作为执行禁令的前提，并提出了四因素的指引性规则，第一次从正面规定了发出禁令的肯定性条件。
在微软收购诺基亚的经营者集中反垄断调查中，商务部附加的限制性条件要求，诺基亚不能通过执行禁令阻止附有FRAND承诺的标准的实施，除非专利权人已经提供了符合FRAND原则的条件，而潜在被许可人却没有善意签订FRAND许可并遵守这些许可条款。可见商务部将“标准必要专利权人履行FRAND承诺，而标准必要专利使用人没有善意签订FRAND许可并遵守许可条款”作为执行禁令的前提。之后在诺基亚收购阿尔卡特朗讯股权案的经营者集中反垄断调查中，商务部又重申了这一前提。
2015年12月31日国家发改委公布的《国务院反垄断委员会关于滥用知识产权的反垄断指南》（征求意见稿）提出，核准标准必要专利权人的禁令救济需要考虑四方面因素包括：
1.谈判双方在谈判过程中的行为表现及其体现出的真实意愿；
2.相关标准必要专利所负担的有关禁令救济的承诺；
3.谈判双方在谈判过程中所提出的许可条件；
4.申请禁令救济对许可谈判、相关市场及下游市场竞争和消费者利益的影响。
这表明我国已明确标准必要专利权人获得禁令救济的肯定性条件，并进行了可操作性相对较强的细化，虽然上述指南可能仅为部门规章层级的立法，但其中这些考量因素将对法院审判工作产生重要的影响。
三、结论
前述分析表明，中国的法院、行政机关在考虑禁令救济的问题时，都将标准必要专利的权利人是否履行FRAND义务以及被许可人是否存在恶意磋商作为禁令救济的考量因素，只是行政机关进一步明确了禁令救济的具体条件。综合上述因素，笔者认为，如若标准必要专利的权利人在中国法院寻求禁令救济，需满足下列所有条件才可能获得支持：
1.向标准必要专利使用人提供符合FRAND承诺的邀约，在双方磋商的过程中要善意行事。在中国立法及司法实践已完全接受了FRAND原则的前提下，标准必要专利权人不违反公平、合理、无歧视义务是发出禁令的重要前提。
2.标准必要专利使用人没有善意行事，具体包括两种情形：
（1）怠于与权利人进行许可协商，如故意拖延谈判等。由于标准必要专利权人负有FRAND义务，标准必要专利使用人往往借此拖延谈判，逼迫标准必要专利权人接受较低的许可费率，形成“专利反向挟持”，而禁令救济正是为了帮助标准必要权人在履行FRAND承诺的情况下应对专利反向挟持。
（2）提出的许可条件不合理。这是因为标准必要专利权人一旦接受不合理的许可条件，将导致许可双方利益失衡，违反对其他标准必要专利使用人的FRAND许可承诺，最终将导致标准必要专利权人无法从专利许可中获得可观的收益。禁令救济将有效阻止标准必要专利使用人提出不合理的许可条件。
3.禁令不会危及公共利益。由于标准必要专利往往是专利组合的一部分，标准必要专利被禁止实施，往往会对一项产品或一个行业产生重大影响，而最终损害的肯定是位于产业链终端的消费者的利益，因此标准必要专利的禁令救济必须考虑对公共利益的影响。例如，禁止普通消费者使用已经进入市场的相关产品这样的诉请一般不会得到法院的支持。
Seeking Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents in China
Helen Cheng Will Wang Jimmy Chen
Ⅰ、Introduction
With the rapid development and dissemination of technology in the modern world, disputes involving standard essential patents (“SEP”) and patents subject to reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing (“FRAND”) are becoming increasingly prevalent. The interplay and interconnected nature of modern technology poses unique challenges in the balancing of intellectual property rights with the public interest and continued innovation. The availability and applicability of injunctive relief are particularly important questions at this intersection of conflicting interests. Different countries have adopted differing practices on the availability of injunctive relief for holders of SEPs. This article discusses when a holder of an SEP may be eligible for injunctive relief in the US, Germany and China by reviewing relevant legislation, judicial practices and administrative practices and focuses on the potential factors relevant to SEP holders seeking injunctive relief in China.
Ⅱ、US and German Practice
US courts apply the well-established four-factor balancing test commonly used in injunctions, to injunctions for patent infringement cases. ③[3] However, FRAND patents have unique difficulty satisfying this four-factor test. Holders of FRAND patents have committed to fair licensing terms and not to deny licenses. Therefore, there is an underlying presumption that monetary damages are sufficient in disputes involving FRAND patents because of these FRAND commitments. In addition, the fundamental logic of FRAND patents is to benefit the public interest. These features make it especially challenging for FRAND patent holders to demonstrate several elements in the four-factor test, namely irreparable harm, the inadequacy of monetary damages and the preservation of the public interest.
However, in Apple v. Motorola, the court indicated that it would be theoretically possible for the holder of a FRAND patent to obtain an injunction in certain situations where a licensee is engaged in bad faith. One example the court gives is if an infringer refuses to pay the FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations.
German courts track American practice in certain aspects. There, a holder of an SEP subject to FRAND would only be entitled to an injunction against infringers if eight conditions are met. ④[4] However, to date, there has not been a single instance in which a holder of an SEP has successfully obtained an injunction.
Chinese judicial practice and administrative enforcement refer to American and European practices, which are reflected in legislation, judicial decisions and administrative enforcement.
Ⅲ、Practice and Opinions of Chinese Courts
Compared to US and German practice, Chinese courts seems to pay more attention to the subjective attitudes of holders of SEPs as well as licensees. Chinese courts also focus on formulating restrictions and limitations on the scope of injunctive relief, i.e., the circumstances in which injunctive relief will not be granted. For example, in Huawei v. IDC, the court compared the terms in IDC’s license to Huawei with those in the licenses of Apple, Samsung and other technology companies to conclude that IDC breached its FRAND commitment. Also, the court found that IDC was using its US lawsuit to force Huawei to accept the more onerous licensing terms. The court looked at this combination of facts to determine bad faith by IDC and intimated that a holder of an SEP would unlikely obtain an injunction if it breached its FRAND commitments.
Then on July 31, 2014, the Supreme People’s Court issued the “Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Cases (II) (Draft for Public Comments)(the “Interpretations”),” which provides that the subjective attitudes of both parties in a license are the primary considerations when deciding to grant an injunction. For example, Art. 25 in the Interpretations states,
During negotiation process between an SEP patentee and licensee, if the patentee willfully violates fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing commitments and causes a failure of negotiation, and the licensee has no obvious fault in the negotiation process, then the court generally should not grant the SEP patentee’s injunction claims.
This approach reinforces the holding of Huawei v. IDC, which provided that SEP holders that neglect their FRAND commitments are unlikely to receive injunctive relief, especially when their licensees are negotiating in good faith.
Ⅳ、Practice and Opinions of Chinese Administrative Authorities
Similar to Chinese courts, Chinese administrative authorities also look whether holders of FRAND patents observe and honor their FRAND commitments in their dealings with licensees as a premise enforcing injunctions. In contrast to the courts, which seldom deal with SEP injunctions given their rarity, administrative bodies have had more opportunity to explore these issues given their roles in antitrust and anti-monopoly investigations. Chinese administrative authorities have also developed guidelines, including four factors, to regulate the granting of injunctions for patent infringement.
In the anti-monopoly investigation into Microsoft’s purchase of Nokia (an M&A case), the Ministry of Commerce provided a restriction on the purchase condition by stating “Nokia cannot prevent the implementation of the SEPs, which have FRAND commitments by filing an injunction, unless the licensor provides the FRAND conditions to a potential licensee but the licensee does not sign and follow the FRAND licensing agreement in good faith.” Accordingly, the Ministry of Commerce considers how an SEP holder and its licensee behave as a factor for enforcing an injunction. Where the SEP holder honors its FRAND commitments but the SEP licensee does not act in good faith, an injunction may be appropriate. The Ministry of Commerce reiterated this doctrine in the anti-monopoly investigation into Nokia’s purchase of Alcatel-Lucent.
On December 31, 2015, the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council issued the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Draft for Comments), which provided guidelines on how SEP holders may obtain injunctive relief. The guidelines consist of four factors:
1、The performance and actual will of both parties in the negotiation;
2、Whether the SEP commitment contemplated injunctive relief;
3、The licensing conditions provided by both parties in the negotiation; and
4、The impact of an injunction on licensing negotiations, the relevant market, downstream competition, and consumer welfare.
These guidelines clarify and refine the considerations for injunctive relief by providing clear instructions on how SEP holders may seek injunctions. Although these guidelines are department provisions, if a court hears a case involving an SEP holder seeking an injunction, the court will consider these four factors. Therefore, although these guidelines are not judicial in nature, they still have important influence on Chinese courts.
Ⅴ、Conclusion
Chinese courts and Chinese administrative authorities adopt a consistent approach on injunctive relief for SEPs. The key considerations both courts and administrative authorities examine when deciding the appropriateness of an injunction are whether the holder of the SEP has honored their FRAND commitments and if the licensee has acted in bad faith. Chinese administrative authorities have further clarified certain specific conditions for obtaining injunctive relief.
Generally under Chinese practice, SEP holders may obtain an injunction if the following conditions are met:
1、Licensor provides its licensees with a FRAND offer and acts in good faith in the negotiation.
2、Licensee engages in bad-faith behavior, specifically:
a、Engages in negligent or willful misconduct in the negotiation of the license agreement with the SEP holder, such as willfully delaying negotiations, which is known as “reverse patent hold-up.”
b、Proposes unreasonable license terms. SEP holders cannot accept unreasonable licensing conditions not only because it would be inequitable but also because it would upset the public interest by creating a competitive disadvantage for all other SEP licensees.
3、The injunction does not harm the public interest. SEPs are usually part of a larger patent portfolio, which means preventing the implementation of an SEP can significantly impair a product or an entire industry. This will ultimately harm consumers. Therefore, courts and authorities consider the impact of injunctions on larger public interests. Claims to prevent ordinary consumers from using related products are generally not supported for this reason.
注 释：
① 四要素检测标准即，专利权人必须证明：已遭受不可回复之损害；2.金钱赔偿不足以弥补损失；3.在原告和被告双方面对的困难性衡平考量有利于原告；4.准许核发禁令不会危及公共利益。
② 八个条件包括：1.通知标准必要专利使用人；2.表明提供FRAND许可的意愿；3.提供FRAND许可的书面邀约；4.标准必要专利使用人必须善意行事并迅速回应（不能故意拖延谈判）；5.如果标准必要专利使用人拒绝最初的FRAND邀约，必须基于FRAND条款提出反邀约；6.若仍未达成协议，标准必要专利使用人必须提供充分的保证；7.经双方同意，许可费率可由第三方裁定；8.标准必要专利使用人可在许可实施后或同时对该专利提起诉讼。
③ A petitioner seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate (1) irreparable harm (2) inadequacy of monetary damages (3) balance of hardships between the plaintiff/defendant favors the petitioner and (4) that the public interest would be not harmed by the injunction.
④ The eight conditions are: (1) notifying the SEP user of infringement, (2) expressing willingness to provide a FRAND license, (3) Presenting a written offer for FRAND license, (4) a SEP user must act in good faith and respond promptly (cannot intentionally delay negotiations), (5) if the SEP user rejects the initial FRAND offer, it must propose a counter-offer on FRAND terms, (6) if there is still no agreement, the SEP user must provide adequate security, (7) the royalty rate may, if agreed by both parties, be determined by a third party, (8) the SEP user may challenge the patent in parallel proceedings or after execution of a license.
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